One Sentence Summary: We present evidence showing a robust positive relationship between the percentage of people in a country who disapprove of the leadership of another country and the number of terrorist attacks carried out by people or groups from the former country against people or property from the latter country.
Introduction
Public opinion polls regularly survey people's attitudes on various issues, but relatively little research has explored whether public attitudes translate into concrete actions. For example, it is unknown whether anti-American attitudes in various parts of the world have harmed American business interests or led to a rise in terrorist attacks on American targets (1) . This paper addresses the question of whether there is a relationship between attitudes toward a foreign country, as expressed in public opinion polls, and the occurrence of terrorism against that country.
Specifically, we examine whether the public attitudes in country "i" toward the leadership of country "j" are related to the likelihood that people or groups from country i perpetrate terrorism against people or property from country j. We use data from the
Gallup World Poll on the public opinion of residents in 19 Middle Eastern and North
African countries (MENA, broadly defined) towards the leaders of nine world powers (the U.S.A., U.K., Russia, Germany, France, Canada, Japan, China and India) in 2006-07.
This survey asked representative samples of the public in each country whether they approved or disapproved of the job performance of the leadership in the selected countries. We link this information to the number of terrorist acts committed by people and groups from each of our sample of MENA countries against targets from each of the nine countries in 2004-2008 based on data from the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC). We also control statistically for the effects of several other factors that may be related to terrorism, such as economic conditions, civil liberties, and the geographic distance between countries. Our results point to a robust relationship between public opinion regarding the leadership of a country and the occurrence of terrorism.
Public opinion toward other countries is potentially influenced by many factors, including historical animosities, religious rivalries, and economic competition, but our survey data refer specifically to country i's views of the job performance of the leadership of country j. Although attitudes towards foreign leaders is not the only indicator of attitudes towards a country and its policy (2) , the World Poll data should reflect the approval or disapproval of policies pursued by foreign governments, and the general way in which the leadership of the country is perceived.
Understanding the relationship between public attitudes and the occurrence of terrorism is important because, while terrorist acts are rare, public opinion can provide an early warning signal and alternative indicator of terrorist threats. In addition, estimating the relationship between public opinion and acts of terrorism can help us understand the circumstances that lead to terrorism. For example, general disapproval of another country's leadership and policies could create a broader pool of people who provide material support for terrorist cells or join terrorist groups, resulting in more terrorist acts.
Public opinion could also act as an incentive, providing a source of approval (or disapproval) encouraging (or discouraging) individuals to participate in terrorist activities. If public opinion toward another country is unrelated to the incidence of terrorism perpetrated against that country, there would be support for the view that terrorism is carried out by a fringe group with views and support networks that lie far from the mainstream of society.
Data
The Gallup World Poll has been conducted in more than 130 countries (3). We have obtained access to the micro survey data for 2006 and 2007 to compute statistics on public opinion concerning foreign countries. The specific question we utilize is: "Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of [named country]?" Permissible answers are either approve or disapprove. The specific named countries were U.S.A., U.K., Russia, Germany, France, Canada, Japan, China and India, although Canada and India were not asked in all countries. These nine countries were selected by Gallup because they are world powers in terms of economic size, population or military strength. About 1,000 people were surveyed in each country per year, usually in face-toface interviews. Samples were drawn to be nationally representative, and sample weights were provided to adjust for nonresponse disproportionalities. Using the available data, we calculated the (weighted) percentage of the population who disapproved of the job performance of each of the nine countries' leaders, which we refer to as the disapproval rate.
We focus on public opinion in MENA countries because the occurrence of terrorism directed at the nine powers was rare outside of the MENA region. Specifically, we have data on Afghanistan, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. We drop Afghanistan from our regression analysis because GDP is not available for the country. Disapproval of the performance of foreign leadership varied across the countries, from a disapproval rate of 13 percent (Morocco regarding Canada) to a high of 91 or 92 percent (UAE regarding U.S. and Cyprus regarding U.S.). There was also considerable variation within countries.
For example, looking just at Saudi Arabians, the disapproval rate ranged from 34 percent concerning Japan to 88 percent concerning the U.S. Table 1 reports the average disapproval rate (and minimum and maximum) in each MENA country and the average disapproval rate (and minimum and maximum) of the leadership of the nine powers.
[ Table 1 Our analysis sample consists of up to 18 x 9 = 162 country-by-country cells. For purposes of our analysis, we refer to the 18 MENA countries as the origin countries and the nine powers as the target countries, whether those countries were attacked intentionally or unintentionally. Because of missing data on public opinion (omission of questions concerning Canada and India) in some origin countries, the sample is reduced to 144 cells. Restricting attention to these cells, there is a total of 952 terrorist attacks in this period. However, 841 of these incidents were perpetrated by groups from Pakistan against targets from India. The next highest number of incidents was 13 attacks carried out by Palestinians with victims from the U.S. The Pakistan-India cell is clearly an outlying observation. Moreover, the fact that Pakistan and India share a border suggests that a different process could be at work for these two countries. Consequently, in most of our analysis we drop the Pakistan-India pair, but we report on how including them affects our results. This leaves us with 143 country pairs. A total of 111 terrorist attacks were perpetrated by the origin countries against the target countries in this sample, involving 27 pairs (19 percent) of countries.
Other variables used in our analysis include average GDP per capita from 1997 to 2001, population, and civil rights of origin and target countries, and percent Muslim of the population in the origin countries. 1 In addition, we computed the distance between the capital cities of the origin and target countries using the Halversine formula. These variables have been identified as possibly related to the occurrence of terrorism in past research and hence are included as control variables in our analysis (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) .
Statistical Analysis
If the country pairs are divided into quartiles based on the disapproval rate of the leadership of the nine powers by people in the MENA countries, the number of terrorist attacks arising from the MENA countries against people or property in the nine targets rises with disapproval (see Figure 1) . The bivariate correlation between the number of attacks from country i against country j and the corresponding disapproval rate is 0.24 (pvalue < 0.01).
To control for potentially confounding variables and to model the count nature of terrorist incidents, we estimated negative binominal regression models (see Table 2 ). We also estimated zero-inflated negative binomial models, but a Vuong test typically did not reject the simpler negative binomial model. The general form of the models is:
where y ij is the number of terrorist incidents perpetrated by people from country i on people or property of country j, x represents the explanatory variables (e.g., distance
between countries and GDP per capita), i indexes the specific MENA country, and j indexes the target country. Variables that have an ij subscript are specific to the pair, such as country i's view of the job performance of the leaders of country j. Other variables are specific to the origin (i) or target (j) country. A negative binomial was selected to accommodate over dispersion of the dependent variable. We also estimate a fixed effects specification that includes dummy variables for each origin country in lieu of x i β i .
[ Table 2 We estimated several alternative statistical models to explore the robustness of the effect of disapproval rate on the number of terrorist incidents. First, we dropped observations on each origin country, one at a time, and re-estimated both models in Table   2 some 18 times. In these estimates the coefficient on the disapproval rate ranged from Table 2 , and a positive but statistically insignificant effect if the explanatory variables are those in column 3 (which include MENA country dummy variables). Finally, we estimated the models in Table 2 using a Poisson model instead of the negative binomial model and found qualitatively similar results.
Discussion
Our results indicate a positive correlation between the percentage of people in one country who disapprove of the leadership of another country and the number of terrorist attacks carried out by people from the former country against targets from the latter country. This correlation was robust to controlling for several features of the origin and target countries and alternative statistical techniques. Our inclusion of unrestricted origin country dummies absorbs omitted variables, such as radical Islamic education or malefemale educational differences in the origin country, as long as those variables exert a constant effect across potential targets. The finding that the effect of public disapproval hardly changes after we control for country-of-origin dummies suggests that omitted origin-country variables are not biasing our estimates, although it is possible that origin country variables interact with specific targets and therefore are not fully absorbed by the country fixed effects.
Assuming for the moment that the correlation between public opinion and terrorism is not a statistical artifact of omitted variables or reverse causality, there are alternative theoretical interpretations. Greater disapproval of another country's leaders and policies could result in more terrorist incidents for at least two reasons. On one hand, it could increase the number of people in a society who provide material support and encouragement for terrorist cells. On the other hand, it could increase the number of people willing to join terrorist cells and carry out terrorist acts themselves. Of course, both of these effects could occur simultaneously, but understanding the mechanism by which public opinion relates to terrorism can help to inform counterterrorism policies.
For example, if more people are willing to join terrorist groups as a result of a shift in public opinion, then counterterrorism policy could profitably be directed toward disrupting terrorism recruitment, but if material support is the key channel by which public opinion matters then disrupting terrorism financing may be a higher priority.
Figures 2 and 3 provide a useful analytical tool for distinguishing these cases.
Each figure illustrates the latent distribution of disapproval toward country j for people from country i before and after a change in country j's policies that people in country i dislike. It is plausible that international terrorism directed at country j is greeted with greater encouragement and legitimacy as the level of disapproval toward country j held by the median person in country i increases. Suppose further that hatred toward country j must exceed a certain threshold, say C, for someone to join a terrorist group and directly participate in terrorism. In Figure 2 , the entire latent distribution of disapproval has shifted to the right, indicating greater dissatisfaction with country j. In this case, the number of people who hold extreme negative views and who are willing to participate in terrorist attacks against country j has increased considerably (i.e., those above C). In Figure 3 , the view of the median person has shifted by more than in Figure 2 , yet the number of people who hold extreme views in excess of C has not changed.
Under these circumstances, in the Figure 3 case increased terrorism would only rise because the proportion of people willing to provide material or psychological support for terrorism has increased. In Figure 2 , terrorism could increase because the number of people willing to carry out terrorist attacks increased as well as the number of people who facilitate or tacitly encourage terrorism.
The Gallup survey data on the public's views toward the leadership of other countries does not allow us to distinguish between these two cases because we do not know the depth of disapproval toward country j. Instead, we only observe the fraction of people who approve or disapprove of the leadership and policies of another country.
Thus, our measure reflects the median person's view but not the extent of extreme views.
The fact that we observe a correlation between the percentage disapproving of another country and terrorist attacks on that country is consistent with either scenario illustrated in Figure 2 or Figure 3 . Distinguishing between these two cases is important and should be a priority for future research. As Katzenstein and Keohane (1) that public opinion is irrelevant for terrorism because terrorists are extremists who act independently of their countrymen's attitudes towards the leadership of the countries that they attack. To explore the reason why public opinion is correlated with terrorism further, it would be useful to collect additional data on public attitudes that probes the intensity of disapproval of foreign countries and assesses various dimensions of disapproval (e.g., leaders, policies, form of government, people, and so on).
Another extension of the analysis presented here would be to take advantage of changes in the leadership and policies of a country. For example, the election of Barack
Obama -who opposed the war in Iraq, criticized the use of torture and detention of alleged terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, and offered to engage in "aggressive personal diplomacy" with leaders of Middle Eastern countries such as Iran --may well lead to a reduction in public disapproval toward the leadership of the U.S. in the MENA region.
Will changes in terrorist activity accompany changes in public sentiment toward the U.S., if public sentiment does indeed change? Relatedly, when longitudinal data become available, researchers will be able to examine more systematically the potential role of reverse causality; that is, whether attacks by terrorists from country i on country j cause citizens in country i to downgrade their approval of the leadership of country j.
Note: One quarter of country pairs are in each range presented. Authors' calculations from Gallup World Poll data and NCTC WITS data. 
